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OPINION
______________ 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 
18 U.S.C. § 3014, requires a special monetary assessment from 
all persons “convicted of an offense” under certain federal 
laws. James Johnman, Jr. was convicted under three of those 
laws and ordered to pay $5,000 for each conviction, $15,000 
in total. That, in Johnman’s view, is too high. He argues the 
JVTA should be read to impose only one assessment per case, 
not one assessment per count of qualifying conviction. Using 
standard tools of statutory interpretation, we conclude the 
JVTA’s assessment applies to each conviction. So we will 
affirm the sentence set by the District Court. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 Johnman signed a plea agreement with the United States 
admitting to three offenses involving the exploitation of 
children: use of an interstate facility to entice a minor to engage 
in sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 
One); distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Count Two); and possession of child 
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (Count 
Three). And the plea agreement provides a helpful roadmap to 
frame the issue in this appeal. First, each count—and the 
corresponding maximum penalty—appears in an individual 
subparagraph of the agreement. There, together with the term 
of imprisonment, supervised release, and other monetary 
penalties faced, each subparagraph reads, “and a $5,000 special 
victims assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3014.” (App. at 15–16.) 
Second, for clarity, a separate subparagraph aggregates all the 
maximum and mandatory minimum penalties in the three 
counts, including “an additional $15,000 special victims 
assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3014.” (App. at 16.) Third, yet 
another provision of the agreement stipulates that “[Johnman] 
agrees to pay the special victims and court assessments in the 
amount of $15,300 before the time of sentencing or at a time 
directed by this Court.”1 (App. at 17.) And for good measure, 
the District Court explained the $15,000 assessment at 
Johnman’s plea hearing. Johnman offered no objections to any 
of these terms.  
 Finding the agreement satisfactory, the District Court 
sentenced Johnman to 368 months of incarceration, a lifetime 
of supervised release, $1,000 restitution, and $15,300 in 
                                              
1 The additional $300 stems from separate, $100-per-
count assessments imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3013.  
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special assessments. After the entry of judgment, Johnman 
filed a notice of appeal. The plea agreement states Johnman 
waives his right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions 
or sentence. (App. at 20.) But it does permit an appeal if “the 
defendant’s sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the 
statutory maximum for that count.” (App. at 21.) 
The United States moved to enforce the appellate 
waiver and for summary affirmance. A motions panel of this 
Court directed Johnman to address “whether the District 
Court’s imposition of a $15,000 special assessment under the 
Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3014, was 
erroneous.” (Order Dated Jan. 30, 2019.) We now answer that 
question, concluding it was not. 
II. JURISDICTION AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The waiver in Johnman’s plea 
agreement does not preclude our review because it allows him 
to challenge a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum 
created by Congress. And in any event, the parties cannot 
bargain for an illegal sentence. See Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 
149, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Since Johnman failed to object to his sentence before 
the District Court, we review only for plain error. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–
67 (1997). This means “we must decide whether (1) an error 
occurred, (2) the error is ‘plain,’ and (3) it ‘affect[s] substantial 
rights.’” United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 
2019) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 
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507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). We need only consider the first 
prong, as no error occurred. 
III. THE JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING ACT 
REQUIRES A $5,000 ASSESSMENT FOR EACH CONVICTION 
Congress has repeatedly passed legislation channeling 
proceeds collected from child sexual abusers to programs 
supporting victims. Most notably, in 1984, Congress created a 
mandatory special monetary assessment to fund the Crime 
Victims Fund. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 1402, 98 Stat. 2170, 2170–71 (codified as amended at 
34 U.S.C. § 20101). Under that Act, “[t]he court shall assess 
on any person convicted of an offense against the United 
States” an amount tied to the severity of the offense. Id. § 1405, 
98 Stat. at 2174–75 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3013). 
The monies deposited into the Fund flow to eligible crime 
victim grant programs and antiterrorism efforts. 34 U.S.C. 
§ 20101. Not surprisingly, questions about the meaning of the 
phrase “convicted of an offense” in § 3013 arose long ago. And 
some three decades back, we held that § 3013 requires one 
assessment per count of conviction. See United States v. 
Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1986). In quick 
succession, the Supreme Court and several circuits reached the 
same conclusion, and the meaning of § 3013 was soon settled.2 
                                              
2 See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301 
(1996) (noting that § 3013 requires a special assessment for 
every count of conviction); United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 
10 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that each felony requires a separate 
special assessment); United States v. Oanh Vu Nguyen, 916 
F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court 
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In 2015, Congress established the Domestic Trafficking 
Victims’ Fund and, to provide financial support, created 
another special monetary assessment applicable to certain 
crimes involving human trafficking and child exploitation. 
Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 101, 129 Stat. 227, 228–30 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3014). Those monies are then used to 
fund eligible trafficking victim and child abuse assistance 
programs. 18 U.S.C. § 3014. And relevant here, Congress used 
nearly identical language in § 3014 as it had in enacting § 3013. 
A. The Language of § 3014 
With that grounding, “[a]s in any statutory construction 
case, ‘[w]e start, of course, with the statutory text.’” Sebelius 
v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 
(2006)). The text of § 3014(a) reads:  
In general.—Beginning on the date of enactment 
of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 
2015 and ending on September 30, 2021, in 
addition to the assessment imposed 
under section 3013, the court shall assess an 
amount of $5,000 on any non-indigent person or 
entity convicted of an offense under— 
 
                                              
needed to impose an assessment for each conviction); United 
States v. McGuire, 909 F.2d 440, 441–42 (11th Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam) (concluding that the special assessment applies per 
count of conviction); United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 686 
(10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dobbins, 807 F.2d 130, 132 
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 381 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
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(1) chapter 77 (relating to peonage, slavery, and 
trafficking in persons); 
 
(2) chapter 109A (relating to sexual abuse); 
 
(3) chapter 110 (relating to sexual exploitation 
and other abuse of children); 
 
(4) chapter 117 (relating to transportation for 
illegal sexual activity and related crimes); or 
 
(5) section 274 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324) (relating to 
human smuggling), unless the person induced, 
assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who 
at the time of such action was the alien’s spouse, 
parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) 
to enter the United States in violation of law. 
 
 “As usual, our job is to interpret the words consistent 
with their ‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted 
the statute.’” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 
2070 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Broken down for ease, 
subsection (a) requires that courts (1) assess (2) an amount of 
$5,000 (3) on any non-exempt person or entity (4) convicted of 
an offense (5) under certain enumerated chapters of the 
criminal code. Thus, how many assessments a court must 
impose turns on the meaning of the phrase “convicted of an 
offense” in the subsection. We examine the ordinary meaning 
of those words individually and in context. 
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 First, an “offense” is “a crime,” a “violation of the law.” 
Offense, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); accord 
Offense, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (“a 
breach of a law or rule; an illegal act”). Giving this word its 
ordinary meaning, “offense” is best read to refer to a discrete 
criminal act. “Convicted,” in turn, is the past participle of 
“convict,” which means “to find or declare guilty of an offense 
or crime[.]” Convict, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added); accord Convict, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“to find (a person) 
guilty of a criminal offense”). So “convicted” as normally 
understood is an offense-specific term. Combining these terms, 
a defendant like Johnman who pleads guilty to three counts has 
been “convicted” of three separate “offense[s]”—or, put 
another way, has three times been “convicted of an offense.” 
And for every conviction, the sentencing court “shall assess an 
amount of $5,000.” 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a). 
 Second, the statute uses the singular construction—
“convicted of an offense.” Id. (emphasis added). As the First 
Circuit has noted, Congress’s use of the singular “an offense” 
is best read to mean that “each offense” requires a separate 
assessment, no matter how many convictions. See Luongo, 11 
F.3d at 10. The most natural reading of the phrase “convicted 
of an offense” means an assessment imposed on each 
qualifying conviction. 
 Third, the balance of the statute confirms the ordinary 
reading of subsection (a). Other references to the assessment in 
the rest of § 3014 take three forms: (1) “[a]n assessment under 
subsection (a)”;3 (2) “[t]he amount assessed under subsection 
                                              
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3014(b). 
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(a)”;4 and (3) “the obligation to pay an assessment imposed on 
or after the date of enactment[.]”5 All three add even more 
clarity to the best reading of subsection (a). 
 Start with subsection (b): 
(b) Satisfaction of other court-ordered 
obligations.—An assessment under subsection 
(a) shall not be payable until the person subject 
to the assessment has satisfied all outstanding 
court-ordered fines, orders of restitution, and any 
other obligation related to victim-compensation 
arising from the criminal convictions on which 
the special assessment is based. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3014(b) (emphasis added). 
 Congress’s use of indefinite and definite articles when 
referencing the special assessment is telling. That is because 
“‘[w]ords are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and 
usage would assign them.’” Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 
965 (2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 140 (2012)). In writing “an assessment under subsection 
(a)” Congress chose the indefinite article “an” to modify 
“assessment.” As an indefinite article, “a” or “an” “implies that 
the thing referred to is nonspecific.” Indefinite Article, New 
Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); see also 
McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015) 
(analyzing the significance of Congress’s use of an indefinite 
                                              
4 See id. § 3014(f). 
5 See id. § 3014(g). 
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article to mean some undetermined or unspecified particular); 
cf. Shamokin Filler Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 772 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that 
Congress’s choice of a definite article—rather than an 
indefinite article—regulated activity at a particular place). And 
so too here, Congress left the aggregate amount assessed under 
subsection (a) dependent on the amount of qualifying 
convictions.6 
 Then, after first establishing “assessment” to mean an 
indefinite or unrestrictive amount, Congress rightly pivots 
when returning to “assessment” later in the same subsection. 
Here, the statute twice uses the definite article “the” to modify 
                                              
6 We recognize that one could interpret subsection (b)’s 
use of the indeterminate “an” in more than one way. But the 
structure of the statute clarifies that “an” refers to the 
indeterminate total amount of the assessment. Subsection (a) 
imposes an assessment if two conditions exist: (1) the person 
is non-indigent; and (2) the person or entity is convicted of an 
enumerated offense. Subsection (b) then assigns a lower 
priority to that assessment, explaining that it will not be 
payable until other specified debts are satisfied. So read 
together, the qualifications of subsection (b) only come into 
play if an assessment is ordered. And since an assessment 
cannot be issued against the indigent or for a non-enumerated 
conviction, the conditions of (b) simply do not arise in a matter 
involving those exempted or inapplicable classes. In short, the 
reader has no occasion to consider the conditions of subsection 
(b) if the conditions of subsection (a) are not satisfied. All of 
which illustrates that even if a word can bear more than one 
meaning, it is the best ordinary reading of a statute we seek. 
See Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2072. 
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“assessment” and thus looks back to the initial reference to 
assessment in the subsection. And so, read naturally, “the 
assessment” or “the special assessment” in subsection (b) 
means the total amount of “an assessment under subsection 
(a).” Congress repeats this arrangement in subsection (g): “the 
obligation to pay an assessment imposed on or after the date of 
enactment of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 
shall not cease until the assessment is paid in full.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3014(g) (emphasis added). 
 So too with the formulation in subsection (f), “[t]he 
amount assessed under subsection (a),” where Congress does 
not quantify “the amount.” Subsection (f) employs the 
indeterminate phrase “the amount” to signify an unrestricted 
sum. When used in this context, “amount” means “a quantity 
of something, typically the total of a thing or things in number, 
size, value, or extent[.]” Amount, New Oxford American 
Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added). Congress’s choice 
therefore leaves “the amount assessed” open to more than one 
monetary value. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(f). 
 In all, the words of § 3014 confirm the District Court 
was correct to impose a $15,000 special assessment under the 
JVTA. 
B. The Special Assessment in § 3014 Mirrors the  
Neighboring Special Assessment in § 3013 
This reading of § 3014 agrees with our long-standing 
interpretation of the assessment codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3013. 
Recall that § 3014 instructs that the special assessment applies 
“in addition to the assessment imposed under section 3013.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3014(a). And well before Congress wrote § 3014, 
the meaning of the phrase “convicted of an offense” in § 3013 
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was settled in the federal courts. That history is significant, for 
when Congress uses a phrase that has a settled judicial 
interpretation, we presume it adopts that interpretation when it 
chooses to repeat the same text in a new statute. See Lamar, 
Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1762 
(2018); see also Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. 
Med., 900 F.3d 104, 117 (3d Cir. 2018). Under this prior-
construction canon, “if courts have settled the meaning of an 
existing provision, the enactment of a new provision that 
mirrors the existing statutory text indicates, as a general matter, 
that the new provision has that same meaning.” Lightfoot v. 
Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563 (2017) (citing 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)). By borrowing 
nearly identical language when drafting § 3014, Congress gave 
its implicit endorsement of courts’ treatment of § 3013, as the 
“repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates . . . 
the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.” 
Berardelli, 900 F.3d at 117 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645). 
 And more than history and location link § 3013 and 
§ 3014. Section 3014’s cross-reference to § 3013 further 
counsels courts to interpret the two statutes in lockstep, as it 
would be incongruous to conclude Congress intended courts to 
read the same phrase differently when applying assessments to 
the same defendant in the same case. We can also dismiss the 
possibility that Congress sought to alter the settled 
interpretation of § 3013’s phrase “convicted of an offense” 
when it enacted § 3014. To the contrary, “‘[t]he modification 
by implication of the settled construction of an earlier and 
different section [or a related statute] is not favored.’” TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514, 1520 (2017) (quoting United States v. Madigan, 300 
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U.S. 500, 506 (1937)). Thus, absent “clear indication” of 
Congress’s plan to change the meaning of a judicially settled 
construction, that construction should not be disturbed. Id. As 
a result, “[t]he broader statutory context points to the same 
conclusion the immediate text suggests.” Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. 
at 2071. 
 And the logic used by courts to interpret § 3013 extends 
to § 3014 as well. See Luongo, 11 F.3d at 10 (explaining that 
“because the statute is phrased in the singular, its terms imply 
that each offense—each felony—calls for a separate special 
assessment, even when a single defendant is simultaneously 
convicted of multiple charges”). Just as with § 3013, it is 
illogical to read § 3014’s application to depend “not upon the 
number of offenses of which [the defendant] was convicted,” 
but on the happenstance of “whether she was tried for those 
offenses in one or more proceedings.” Donaldson, 797 F.2d at 
128 (citing Pagan, 785 F.2d at 381).7 
                                              
7 In trying to distinguish § 3014 from § 3013, Johnman 
highlights several ways in which § 3014 “is more onerous” 
(Appellant’s Br. at 16), including that the amount of the 
assessment is much higher, compare 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a), with 
id. § 3013(a), that the obligation to pay it lasts longer, compare 
id. § 3014(g), with id. § 3013(c), and that § 3014(a) contains 
an indigency exception while § 3013(a) does not. All true, but 
our role is not to “second-guess Congress’ decision.” Rotkiske 
v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019). There is no freestanding 
rule of statutory interpretation that a court may rewrite statutes 
to be less “onerous” to criminal defendants. Indeed, that 
Congress created an indigency exception in § 3014(a) shows it 
grasped the severity of the assessment. 
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 For these reasons, the text of § 3013 and its context 
leave only one interpretation: where a defendant is non-
indigent, a separate $5,000 assessment applies to every 
qualifying count of conviction.8 
C. Lenity is Inapplicable 
 Finally, Johnman argues the “rule of lenity” requires 
resolving any statutory ambiguities in his favor. “[T]he 
touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco 
v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation 
                                              
8 Johnman looks to overcome the language of § 3014 
with comments from members of Congress. For instance, 
Johnman cites remarks by one of the JVTA’s legislative 
sponsors—made two years after the law’s enactment—
explaining that the JVTA “also allows a federal judge to 
impose an additional assessment of up to $5,000.” (Opening 
Br. at 9 (quoting 163 Cong. Rec. H4564 (daily ed. May 24, 
2017)).) Generally, “[p]ost-enactment legislative history is not 
a reliable source for guidance” in assessing the ordinary 
meaning of a statute. Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886, 
898 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive 
Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 698–99 (3d Cir. 2016). And in any event, 
those remarks fight the text of the statute: the JVTA is not 
permissive and does not “allow” judges to impose an 
assessment “up to” $5,000. Rather, the assessment is 
mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a) (“the court shall assess an 
amount of $5,000” (emphasis added)). So these comments lend 
Johnman no support, for we “must presume that Congress 
‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there.’” Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360 (quoting Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). 
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marks omitted). But invoking the rule “requires more than a 
difficult interpretative question.” United States v. Flemming, 
617 F.3d 252, 270 (3d Cir. 2010). Rather, the rule “comes into 
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress 
has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding 
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” United States v. 
Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 455 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Callanan 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)).9 And it may be 
applied only where we are left with “grievous ambiguity” after 
applying all other traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 474–75 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Johnman sees ambiguity not in the text, but in the 
application of § 3014(a), citing inconsistencies in the 
assessments imposed by district courts in this Circuit.10 But 
that is not enough, for “[a] statute is not ambiguous for 
purposes of lenity merely because there is a division of judicial 
authority over its proper construction.” Reno v. Koray, 515 
U.S. 50, 64–65 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
9 We inverted this order in Donaldson, considering, and 
rejecting, the rule of lenity before turning to the “normal 
canons of statutory construction.” 797 F.2d at 127–28. That 
path has been repudiated by later case law, and neither party 
suggests we must apply it here. 
10 Compare United States v. Porter, No. 2-16-cr-00036 
(E.D. Pa.) (imposing a $5,000 JVTA assessment based on two 
qualifying convictions), with United States v. Leroy, No. 2-16-
cr-00243 (W.D. Pa.) (imposing a $20,000 JVTA assessment 
based on four qualifying convictions), and United States v. 
Johnman, No. 2-17-cr-00245 (E.D. Pa.) (imposing a $15,000 
JVTA assessment based on three qualifying convictions). 
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Because we find the statute clear, the rule of lenity does not 
affect our review.11 
 The $5,000 assessment under the Justice for Victims of 
Trafficking Act applies to each qualifying count of conviction. 
We will thus affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
                                              
11 Even assuming we found the assessment under the 
JVTA ambiguous, for the rule of lenity to apply we would need 
to assess whether the statute imposes a criminal rather than 
civil sanction—an issue we do not reach today. 
